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ARTICLE 
 
Advocacy Strategies for Promoting Greater 
Consideration of Climate Change and Human 
Rights in Development Activities:  
The Case of the West Seti Hydroelectric Project 
in Nepal 
LISE JOHNSON* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Construction may soon begin on the West Seti Hydroelectric 
Project (WSHP) in the western region of Nepal.  The 750-
megawatt facility, which will produce power primarily for export 
to India, involves construction of a 195-meter high dam on the 
Seti River that will inundate over 2000 hectares of land.1  The 
resulting reservoir, developments downstream of the dam, and 
transmission lines running from the WSHP are predicted to affect 
18,269 people in 2,421 households,2 requiring an estimated 1,393 
of those households to be resettled.3 
 
* LL.M., Columbia Law School, 2009; J.D., University of Arizona Rogers 
College of Law, 2004. Great thanks are due to Rabin Subedi for his information 
and insight on hydropower development in Nepal. Thanks are also due to the 
editors of the Pace Environmental Law Review for their thoughtful critiques.  
Any errors remain those of the author alone. 
 1. SMEC West Seti Hydroelectric Corp. Ltd. (SMEC-WSHL), Project 
Details, http://www.wsh.com.np/project-details/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2009). For 
the purposes of this article, the SMEC West Seti Hydroelectric Corp. Ltd. will be 
referred to as SMEC-WSHL. 
 2. SMEC-WSHL, WEST SETI HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT (VOLUME 3), RESETTLEMENT PLAN:  RESERVOIR AREA AND 
DOWNSTREAM PROJECT COMPONENTS xi (2008), available at http://www.adb.org/ 
Documents/Resettlement_Plans/NEP/40919/40919-NEP-RP.pdf. 
 3. Id. 
1
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The private and public entities promoting and financing the 
project (at an expected cost of $1.6 billion)4—namely, SMEC-
WSHL, the government of Nepal (GoN), and the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB)—argue that the WSHP is a way of 
enabling Nepal to generate much-needed revenue from use of its 
rich water resources, and a means of enabling India to meet its 
energy needs in an allegedly climate-friendly manner—two 
important goals.  It is currently impossible, however, for the 
people of Nepal to determine what price is being paid in order to 
accomplish those aims.  This is because the environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) prepared by SMEC-WSHL, and approved by 
both the ADB and the GoN as a prerequisite to their respective 
approvals of the WSHP, leaves certain major issues regarding the 
project’s possible economic and environmental costs inexplicably 
unaddressed.5  Those major omissions in the EIA all relate to its 
failure to take climate change into account even though scientific 
projections indicate that the phenomenon will affect the long-
term viability of the project, its economic returns for investors 
and Nepal, and its environmental and social consequences.6 
In light of the severe and long-term consequences of unwise 
development of a major dam project such as the WSHP—a project 
which will irreversibly destroy ecosystems, permanently alter 
land and water use in the development region, necessitate 
relocation and resettlement of thousands of people, and require 
investment of vast sums of government and private funds—this 
paper addresses the significant omissions in the WSHP’s EIA in 
an attempt to ensure that development of the project, if pursued, 
proceeds only with full disclosure of its possible costs and 
benefits.  Only through such disclosure will development of the 
project be consistent with the human rights of the Nepali people.  
In Part II, this paper highlights the key climate change-related 
omissions from the EIA that render its portrayal of the project 
misleading.7  Then, in Part III, it discusses how the inadequate 
 
 4. INT’L RIVERS, MOUNTAINS OF CONCRETE:  DAM BUILDING IN THE HIMALAYAS 
11 (2008), available at http://internationalrivers.org/files/IR_Himalayas_rev.pdf. 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. Id. 
 7. This paper focuses specifically on climate change-related omissions from 
the EIA. It does not aim to catalogue the myriad other environmental and 
human rights issues arising out of development of the WSHP. For a discussion 
of some of those issues, see, e.g., INT’L RIVERS, supra note 4 (discussing issues 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss2/4
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EIA violates the human rights of Nepalese people as guaranteed 
under both domestic Nepalese and international law.  In Part IV, 
the paper suggests some promising options that advocates can 
use to remedy those violations.  Finally, in Part V, this paper 
broadens the discussion beyond the West Seti; and illustrates 
how climate change-related considerations may affect other major 
development projects’ environmental and economic costs and 
benefits, and therefore should increasingly be taken into account 
during project selection and design.  It then identifies how, if such 
considerations are not adequately addressed, advocates can seek 
to remedy those failings by employing the same or analogous 
strategies suggested for use in the case of the WSHP. 
II. WSHP DETAILS 
In 1994, the GoN negotiated a memorandum of 
understanding with the Snowy Mountains Engineering Company 
(SMEC), an Australian corporation, to explore and begin 
pursuing development of the WSHP.8  Among its provisions, the 
1994 agreement provided that SMEC, through a subsidiary 
company it established under the laws of Nepal, the West Seti 
Hydroelectric Corporation Limited (SMEC–WSHL), would 
initiate work to prepare a Detailed Engineering Report (DER) on 
the project.9  In 1997, SMEC-WSHL and the GoN entered into 
additional agreements to further the development of the WSHP: 
 
with the WSHP and other planned developments in the Himalayas); Ananta Raj 
Luitel, West Seti Verdict a Watershed—“Decision Not in National Interest”, 
HIMALAYAN TIMES, Sept. 8, 2008; YUKI TANABE, JAPAN CTR. FOR A SUSTAINABLE 
ENV’T & SOC’Y, REPORT ON THE WEST SETI HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT AND ADB 
POLICY VIOLATIONS (2007), available at http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/ 
JACSES_Report_on_West_Seti.pdf. Also, for a discussion of issues arising out of 
construction of large dams generally, see, e.g., INTERAMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, LARGE DAMS IN THE AMERICAS: IS THE CURE WORSE 
THAN THE DISEASE (2009), available at http://www.aida-americas.org/aida.php? 
page=203&lang=en; THAYER SCUDDER, THE FUTURE OF LARGE DAMS: DEALING 
WITH SOCIAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL COSTS  (2005); 
JACQUES LESLIE, DEEP WATER:  THE EPIC STRUGGLE OVER DAMS, DISPLACED 
PEOPLE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2005); PATRICK MCCULLY, SILENCED RIVERS:  
THE ECOLOGY AND POLITICS OF LARGE DAMS (2001); WORLD COMM’N ON DAMS, 
DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-MAKING (2000). 
 8. West Seti Hydroelectric Project Agreement (1994) (on file with the 
author). 
 9. Id. 
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the first agreement, reached in May, related to the export of 
electricity from the proposed WSHP;10 and the second, reached in 
June, was a “Project Agreement” setting forth the terms and 
conditions for “proceed[ing] with the objective of implementing 
the [750 MW WSHP].”11 
The Project Agreement stated that SMEC–WSHL would 
prepare an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of the 
WSHP “as part of the DER in accordance with the National 
Environmental Impact Assessment Guidelines, 2050, the 
Environment Protection Act, 2053 and any relevant rules and 
guidelines made thereunder.”12  SMEC–WSHL submitted the 
DER to the government in December 1997, and received approval 
of that report in January 1999.13  Subsequently in August 1999, 
SMEC–WSHL submitted the EIA to the government.14  Nepal’s 
relevant agency, the Ministry of Population and Environment 
(now the Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology) 
approved the WSHP in 2000.15  In 2007, SMEC–WSHL prepared 
an updated EIA to assess project impacts on the transmission line 
connecting the power generated by the WSHP to the Indian 
electricity transmission grid, as well as to incorporate new 
information on increased costs and the project’s plan to resettle 
and relocate Nepali people affected by the project.16 
As the EIA describes, the project involves construction of a 
195 meter-high concrete-faced rock-fill dam, creating a 2,060-
hectare reservoir area with a total storage capacity of 1,566 
million cubic meters of water.17  The project will require the 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. pmbl., para. D. 
 12. Id. 
 13. SMEC-WSHL, WEST SETI HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT (VOLUME 1), MAIN REPORT 6 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 
EIA], available at http://www.wsh.com.np/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/eia_vol1_ 
complete_document.pdf. 
 14. Id. at 30. 
 15. W. SETI HYDRO LTD. FOR THE ADB, SUMMARY ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT, NEPAL: WEST SETI HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT 1 (2007) 
[hereinafter 2007 EIA], available at http://www.adb.org/documents/environ 
ment/nep/40919-nep-seia.pdf. 
 16. Id. In the text, this paper uses the term “EIA” to refer to both the original 
EIA, and any subsequent additions to it, such as this 2007 EIA. If only one is 
referred to, the text or accompanying footnote will make that clear. 
 17. Id. at 2. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss2/4
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acquisition of 2,326 hectares of land, including 659 hectares of 
cultivated land, 806 hectares of forest, 246 hectares of grassland 
and 169 acres of shrub land.18  The entirety of the WSHP is 
located in the Far-Western Development Region of Nepal, one of 
the country’s least developed and poorest areas, with a poverty 
rate of 41% that is well above the national average of 31%.19 
The project is being constructed as a build-own-operate-
transfer scheme, whereby SMEC–WSHL has a thirty-year 
generating license covering the WSHP’s predicted 5.5-year 
construction phase, and the first 24.5 years of the project’s 
commercial operation.20  At the end of that time frame, the project 
will be transferred entirely to the GoN.21  Pursuant to a power 
purchase agreement between SMEC–WSHL and the Power 
Trading Company (India) Limited (PTC), once the WSHP begins 
commercial operation, for the following twenty-five years, PTC 
will purchase from SMEC-WSHL the power generated by the 
project.22  PTC, in turn, will sell that power to India.23  In return 
for its hosting the project and submerging its land and resources, 
the GoN will receive royalties from the sale of power to PTC, and 
can also elect to either receive ten percent of the WSHP’s output 
as free power, or ten percent of the revenue received from India’s 
purchase of the electricity.24 
According to SMEC–WSHL’s 2007 estimates, the GoN will 
receive $991 million in revenue during the course of the 30-year 
generation license, with an average annual benefit of $33 
million.25  After the thirty-year license expires, SMEC-WSHL 
projects that the GoN will receive $170 million per year in 
revenue from electricity sales to India (assuming the prices in the 
power purchase agreement between SMEC–WSHL and PTC 
continue to apply).26  That revenue stream, however, will only be 
temporary because the accumulation of sediment in the reservoir 
 
 18. Id. at 15. 
 19. Id. at 7-8. 
 20. Id. at 2. 
 21. 2007 EIA, supra note 15, at 2. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 29. 
 26. Id. 
5
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will eventually prevent the WSHP from being able to generate 
power.27  According to the EIA, sedimentation in the reservoir 
may terminate the hydropower project’s useful life within twenty-
five years after the project is transferred to the GoN.28  At that 
time, the government will have to decommission the dam, a 
process which will require the government to perform a host of 
significant tasks including: assessing the safety of the dam; 
removing selected facilities and maintaining others; recycling and 
disposing of materials and wastes, including hazardous wastes; 
evaluating the effect of decommissioning on aquatic ecosystems 
and uses of the river water; identifying ways to mitigate negative 
effects of decommissioning; conducting ongoing maintenance, 
surveillance, and security of retained facilities; and budgeting for 
and financing these and other necessary activities.29 
III. THE EIA, ITS SIGNIFICANT OMISSIONS & THEIR 
IMPLICATIONS 
As noted above, SMEC-WSHL submitted its EIA for the 
project to the Nepalese government in August 1999, and received 
approval of the document the following year.30  In 2007, SMEC–
WSHL prepared an updated EIA to assess impacts of the 
transmission line connecting the power to the Indian electricity 
transmission grid, as well as to incorporate new information on 
increased costs and the project’s plan to resettle and relocate 
Nepali people affected by the project.31  As required under Nepali 
law,32 these EIAs (collectively referred to hereafter as the EIA), 
 
 27. 2000 EIA, supra note 13, at 241; W. SETI HYDRO LTD., WEST SETI 
HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT PRELIMINARY DECOMMISSIONING PLAN 2-3 (2007) 
[hereinafter PRELIMINARY DECOMMISSIONING PLAN]. 
 28. 2000 EIA, supra note 13, at 241; PRELIMINARY DECOMMISSIONING PLAN, 
supra note 27, at 2-3. 
 29. PRELIMINARY DECOMMISSIONING PLAN, supra note 27, at 8. 
 30. 2000 EIA, supra note 13, at 30. 
 31. 2007 EIA, supra note 15. 
 32. Environment Protection Rules (Nepal), Schedule 2(e) (1997) (requiring an 
EIA for projects involving the “[o]peration of electricity generation projects with 
a capacity of more than 5 mw,” “[c]onstruction of multipurpose reservoirs,” and 
“[a]ny water resources development activity which displaces more than 100 
people with permanent residence”), Schedule 2(j) (requiring an EIA for proposals 
to be implemented in “[s]emi-arid, mountainous and Himalayan regions”), 
Schedule 2(k) (requiring an EIA for “[o]peration of any planning, project or 
programme relating to any developmental work, physical activities or change in 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss2/4
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were to detail the “technical, geographical, environmental, 
economic, social, cultural and physical aspects of the proposal,” 
and its alternatives’ “[s]hort, medium, and long-term adverse 
impact[s].”33  Review and approval of the EIA by the GoN is a 
prerequisite to development of the WSHP.34 
The EIA, however, omits crucial environmental and economic 
information, and consequently fails to provide either an accurate 
picture of the WSHP’s impacts, or an adequate assessment of the 
project’s alternatives.  More particularly, the EIA fails to address 
three critical issues: (1) the effects of climate change on the 
WSHP and the extent to which climate change alters the 
projected impacts of the project, (2) the implications of the WSHP 
for greenhouse gas (GHG) sinks and emissions in Nepal, and (3) 
the myriad economic and environmental issues associated with 
dam decommissioning once the project is transferred to the 
GoN.35 
 
land use . . . with a cost of more than 100 millions” [sic]), available at 
http://www.lawcommission.gov.np/index.php/ne/--/doc/491/raw. 
 33. Id. sched. 6, paras. 4, 7. 
 34. Environment Protection Act (Nepal), 2053, §§ 3-4 (1997), available at 
http://www.elaw.org/node/1937. 
 35. While the laws and regulations governing preparation of EIAs do not 
specifically require assessment of projects’ impacts on climate change, or 
assessment of the projects as impacted by a changing climate, the broad 
requirement that EIAs describe the “technical, geographical, environmental, 
economic, social, cultural and physical aspects of the proposal,” and its and its 
alternatives’ “[s]hort, medium, and long-term adverse impact[s],” would 
presumably include impacts on and by climate change if such impacts were 
reasonably significant and relevant to the project. Id. As the discussion in this 
Part II aims to illustrate, the potential climate change-related impacts on and 
by the WSHP are significant and merit attention. Case law in the United States 
regarding analysis of environmental impacts under the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (2006), and its state law 
analogues similarly supports the argument that if they are relevant to a 
project’s environmental impacts, climate change-related considerations should 
be taken into account in analyzing and selecting projects and policies. See, e.g., 
Ctr. for Bio. Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 508 F.3d 508 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (holding that the federal agency’s Environmental Assessment under 
NEPA was inadequate due to its failure to adequately address the impacts its 
proposed rule and available alternatives would have on greenhouse gas 
emissions); NRDC v. South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist.,  No. BS 110792 (L.A. 
Co. Super. Ct. July 28, 2008) (holding that the state entity’s failure to discuss 
the impacts its rule would have on greenhouse gas emissions and climate 
change violated California’s Environmental Quality Act). 
7
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A. Effects of Climate Change on the WSHP 
Evidence of the effects of climate change on Nepal’s diverse 
climate, which ranges from tropical in the country’s low 
elevations to arctic in the Himalayas,36 is already apparent.  Data 
on temperatures in Nepal from 1977-1994 reveal a general 
warming trend, with temperature changes being most 
pronounced during the country’s dry winters and in its higher 
elevations.37  “Significant glacier retreat as well as significant 
areal expansion of several glacial lakes have also been 
documented in recent decades, with an extremely high likelihood 
that such impacts are linked to rising temperatures” caused by 
anthropogenic emission of GHGs.38 Climate change is also 
thought to have produced more intense precipitation events in the 
country, and to have resulted in decreased river flows in the dry 
season.39 
These trends of rising temperatures, retreating glaciers, and 
more intense monsoon seasons are projected to continue.  Based 
on the IPCC’s “B2” scenario, which uses moderate assumptions to 
predict future impacts of climate change,40 a 2003 study using 
 
 36. AHARDUL AGRAWALA ET AL., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 
DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE IN NEPAL:  FOCUS ON WATER RESOURCES AND 
HYDROPOWER 12 (2003), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/51/1974 
2202.pdf. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 13; see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
(IPCC), WORKING GROUP II, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND 
VULNERABILITY 493 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-
wg2.htm. See also GOV’T OF NEPAL & U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, PROJECT 
DOCUMENT—NEPAL:  NATIONAL ADAPTATION PROGRAMME OF ACTION TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE 1 (2008). 
 
[A] range of recent scientific studies show that Nepal is highly vulnerable 
to the potential negative impacts of climate change.  Consistent rises in 
annual mean temperature, less frequent but more intensive rainfall 
events, increasing frequency and intensity of floods, changes in monsoon 
on- and offset, growing threat from Glacial Lake Outburst Floods 
(GLOF), longer dry spells and drought events, and increasingly stronger 
storms have already been experienced in Nepal in the past decade. 
 
Id.  
 39. AGRAWALA ET AL., supra note 36, at 14; see also IPCC, WORKING GROUP II, 
supra note 38, at 476 (noting the observed occurrence of “[s]erious and recurrent 
floods in . . . Nepal”). 
 40. The B2 scenario is one of a family of the IPCC’s Special Report on 
Emissions Scenarios (SRES). The SRES scenarios “explore alternative 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss2/4
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various climate models predicted a “significant and consistent 
increase in temperatures . . . for Nepal for the years 2030, 2050, 
and 2100.”41  Scientists project such trends will trigger 
accelerated “widespread mass loss from glaciers;”42 and that they 
might also be accompanied by more intense summer monsoons, 
which will, in turn, increase the risk of flooding and landslides.”43 
 
development pathways, covering a wide range of demographic, economic and 
technological driving forces and resulting GHG emissions . . . B2 describes a 
world with intermediate population and economic growth, emphasizing local 
solutions to economic, social, and environmental sustainability.”  IPCC, FOURTH 
ASSESSMENT REPORT, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 44 (R.K. Pachauri & A. 
Reisinger eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/ 
syr/ar4_syr.pdf; see also IPCC, SPECIAL REPORT ON EMISSIONS SCENARIOS, 
CHAPTER 4:  AN OVERVIEW OF SCENARIOS (2000), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
ipccreports/sres/emission/091.htm. 
 41. AGRAWALA ET AL., supra note 36, at 15. 
 42. The IPCC’s Working Group II reported these findings in its SUMMARY FOR 
POLICYMAKERS. See  SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 40, at 49. In its 
more detailed, 938-page report, the Working Group II included a specific 
projection about the rate and extent of glacial loss, stating the following: 
 
Glaciers in the Himalayas are receding faster than in any other part of 
the world . . . and, if the present rate of [Himalayan glacial loss] . . .  
continues, the likelihood of them disappearing by the year 2035 and 
perhaps sooner is very high if the Earth keeps warming at the current 
rate.  Its total area will likely shrink from the present 500,000 to 100,000 
km2 by the year 2035.  
 
GROUP II, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 493 
(2007). In January 2010, the Chair and Vice-Chairs of the IPCC and the Co-
Chairs of the IPCC Working Groups issued a statement criticizing that 
paragraph as including “poorly substantiated estimates of rate of recession and 
date for the disappearance of Himalayan glaciers.”  IPCC, IPCC STATEMENT ON 
THE MELTING OF HIMALAYAN GLACIERS (2010), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/present 
ations/himalaya-statement-20january2010.pdf. The statement, however, also 
emphasized that the issues with that particular paragraph in the nearly 
thousand-page Working Group II report did not invalidate the report’s other 
findings and conclusions. The January 2010 statement affirmed that earlier 
projections regarding “[w]idespread mass losses from glaciers” remained “robust, 
appropriate, and entirely consistent with the underlying science and the broader 
IPCC assessment.” Id. 
 43. AGRAWALA ET AL., supra note 36, at 16. The models projected,  
 
an overall increase in annual precipitation. However, given the high 
standard deviation [reflecting inconsistent results of various models used 
for the projections,] the results for annual precipitation should be 
interpreted with caution. Even more speculative is the slight increase in 
winter precipitation.  The signal however is somewhat more pronounced 
for the increase in precipitation during the summer monsoon months 
(June, July, and August).  
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Such projections relating to climate change have extremely 
significant and pressing implications for hydropower development 
in Nepal and, more particularly, the WSHP.44  Yet these 
implications—three of which are discussed below—were not 
addressed in the EIA. 
i. Glacial Lake Outburst Floods 
Glacial lakes are common at high altitudes of the Nepal 
Himalaya, forming and growing as glaciers melt and retreat.45  
The water in these lakes is generally held by moraine (glacial 
debris) or ice barriers.46  When the amount of water in the glacial 
lakes increases, and/or the barriers of ice restraining the water 
melt and thus weaken, the risk increases that the barrier will no 
longer be able to restrain the impounded water, causing a glacial 
lake outburst flood (GLOF).47  GLOFs can be extremely powerful, 
and at “their extreme . . . can release millions of cubic meters of 
water in a few hours.”48  With the floodwater, GLOFs also can 
transport significant amounts of sediment and debris.  GLOFs 
are thus a concern for hydropower development because the 
surges of water, sediment and debris can pose significant risks to 
project structures, and can fill reservoirs with sediment, thereby 
limiting the useful life of hydropower projects.49 
Because melting and receding glaciers form glacial lakes and 
can cause GLOFs, climate change, which is accelerating the pace 
of glacial retreat, is increasing the number and size of glacial 
lakes, as well as the number and severity of GLOFs in mountain 
 
Id. 
 44. Id. at 17 (ranking as “high” (1) the certainty of climate change’s impacts 
on water resources and hydropower development, (2) the “urgency” of the 
impacts, (3) the severity of the impacts, and (4) the importance of the resource); 
WORLD WILDLIFE FED’N (WWF), AN OVERVIEW OF GLACIERS, GLACIER RETREAT, 
AND SUBSEQUENT IMPACTS IN NEPAL, INDIA AND CHINA 10 (2005), available at 
http://assets.panda.org/downloads/himalayaglaciersreport2005.pdf (discussing 
how “[c]limate plays a large role in determining the feasibility of hydro-
projects.”). 
 45. Richard Kattelmann, Glacial Lake Outburst Floods in the Nepal 
Himalaya: A Manageable Hazard?, 28 NATURAL HAZARDS 145, 146 (2003). 
 46. Id. at 146-47. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. AGRAWALA ET AL., supra note 36, at 17. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss2/4
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areas such as the Himalayas.50  The incidence and magnitude of 
GLOFs is predicted to continue to rise with further global 
warming.51 
The 2000 EIA acknowledges the general problem of GLOFs.  
It notes that there are eight known glacial lakes in the area 
draining into the WSHP, with the surface areas of those lakes 
ranging from 500 square meters to 800,000 square meters.52  It 
also notes that GLOFs pose a risk of threat to the lives of WSHP 
workers stationed in GLOF flood zones, and can destabilize the 
reservoir foreshore, damage project facilities, and reduce the 
reservoir’s storage capacity by increasing the flow of sediment.53  
The EIA then asserts that the risks to the WSHP caused by 
GLOFs can be adequately mitigated by (1) designing the dam so 
as to be “resistant to GLOF surge waves,” and (2) installing a 
monitoring and warning system to minimize risk to life.54 
The EIA, however, fails to discuss how climate change is 
likely to exacerbate the threats posed by GLOFs and to evaluate 
the project in light of these enhanced risks.  The EIA mentions 
without elaboration that “there is a potential for new [glacial] 
lakes to form due to the continued retreat of main valley 
glaciers,” but provides no additional analysis regarding the 
implications of a growing number of glacial lakes, and decreasing 
stability of those lakes due to increased snow and ice melt.55  
 
 50. Erica J. Thorson, On Thin Ice: The Failure of the United States and the 
World Heritage Committee to Take Climate Change Mitigation Pursuant to the 
World Heritage Convention Seriously, 38 ENVTL. L. 139, 142 (2008). 
 51. UNFCCC, CLIMATE CHANGE:  IMPACTS, VULNERABILITIES AND ADAPTATION 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 20 (2008). 
 
Global warming is causing the melting of glaciers in the Himalayas.  In 
the short term, this means increased risk of flooding, erosion, mudslide 
and GLOF in Nepal . . . Because the melting of snow coincides with the 
summer monsoon season, any intensification of the monsoon and/or 
increase in melting is likely to contribute to flood disasters in Himalayan 
catchments.  In the longer term, global warming could lead to a rise in 
the snowline and disappearance of many glaciers causing serious impacts 
on the populations relying on the [seven] main rivers in Asia fed by melt 
water from the Himalayas.  
 
Id.  
 52. 2000 EIA, supra note 13, at 71. 
 53. Id. at 153. 
 54. Id. at 154. 
 55. Id. 
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Significantly, it offers no projections or analysis regarding the 
impacts the increased occurrence of such floods might have on 
fundamental issues such as the life of the project, the long-term 
availability of water, and/or the quality of water in the reservoir.  
By failing to assess how the project’s desirability and viability 
might be affected by the likely increase in GLOFs, the EIA 
presents a misleadingly incomplete picture of the WSHP’s 
possible environmental and economic impacts. 
ii. Decreased Glacial Melt 
Glaciers act as crucial reservoirs that, as they melt, provide 
freshwater resources and support for rivers.56  The loss of 
Himalayan glaciers and their freshwater storage capacity is 
projected to eventually cause a reduction in stream flow and 
resulting shortages of water that is currently relied upon by 
millions for drinking, agriculture, and industry, and crucial for 
ecosystem support.57  Without adequate glacial melt, some 
perennial rivers in the Gangetic river basin (including the Ganges 
River itself), to which the Seti eventually drains, could begin to 
flow only seasonally.58 
With respect to the WSHP in particular, as the ability of 
glaciers to store (and then release) water in the project catchment 
area decreases, the rate of inflow into the reservoir could also 
fall.59  This, in turn, could dampen fundamental projections 
regarding the amount of power and revenue the WSHP will 
generate.  Decreased inflow of glacial melt into the WSHP 
catchment can also negatively impact the quality of water in the 
reservoir and the quality of water released downstream of the 
dam and power facilities.60  Yet, like the risks posed by increasing 
 
 56. IPCC, WORKING GROUP II, supra note 38, at 493; WWF, supra note 44, at 
3. 
 57. IPCC, WORKING GROUP II, supra note 38, at 493; WWF, supra note 44, at 
3, 27-28; ARGAWALA ET AL., supra note 36, at 17; U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, 
GLOBAL OUTLOOK FOR ICE AND SNOW 24 (2007), http://www.unep.org/geo/geo_ 
ice/PDF/full_report_LowRes.pdf. 
 58. IPCC, WORKING GROUP II, supra note 38, at 493. 
 59. WWF, supra note 44, at 7. 
 60. 2000 EIA, supra note 13, at 16 (stating that “[t]he residence of time of 
stored water in the reservoir is an important parameter to consider when 
examining water quality”). Id. at 122 (“Water quality within the reservoir will 
primarily be a function of the quality of inflows entering the reservoir, local 
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GLOFs, the EIA ignores these possible effects of climate change 
when discussing the project’s economic returns and its 
relationship with and impacts on water use and water quality in 
the project area and the broader watershed. 
iii. Increased Intensity of Precipitation Events 
As mentioned above, a third projected effect of climate 
change on Nepal is an increase of “intense precipitation events 
(particularly during the monsoon)” that will, in turn, increase the 
incidence of flooding, landslides, and sedimentation, each of 
which are highly relevant to the feasibility and design of 
hydropower projects.61  When acknowledging and discussing the 
threats that flooding, landslides, and the accumulation of 
sediment pose to the WSHP, however, the EIA ignored the issue 
of climate change and its potential to heighten these risks.62  By 
ignoring these issues, the EIA also fails to address the possibility 
that the WSHP’s power generating capacity might be less and 
useful life shorter than projected, and that calculations of 
economic returns to the GoN might consequently be wholly 
unrealistic. 
B. The WSHP and GHG Emissions 
Nepal is a party to both the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change63 and the Kyoto Protocol.64  As a 
developing country or “non-Annex I” party to those agreements, 
Nepal does not have any specific obligations to reduce or limit its 
GHG emissions.65  Nevertheless, as is discussed below, even 
absent such obligations it is important for Nepal to ensure that it 
is aware of the implications of the WSHP for its net GHG 
emissions. 
 
climatic conditions, the configuration of the reservoir and the period of 
impoundment.”). 
 61. ARGAWALA ET AL., supra note 36, at 17. 
 62. See generally 2000 EIA, supra note 13; 2007 EIA, supra note 15. 
 63. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 
S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 164, 166, 170 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
 64. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22, 33 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
 65. Id. art. 3, Annex B (setting emissions reductions requirements for Annex 
I Parties). 
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For one, in the context of negotiations on a multilateral 
agreement on climate change, many countries are discussing 
ways to incentivize protection and maximization of carbon sinks 
through enhancing forest conservation and improving 
agricultural practices in developing countries.66  While it is not 
clear what mechanisms will be used in a post-Kyoto international 
climate change agreement to incentivize this protection of carbon 
storage capability, it is nevertheless becoming increasingly clear 
that in a world affected by climate change, the ability of domestic 
lands to store carbon is an asset of developing countries that, 
although presently difficult to value, should not be discounted.67  
The EIA states that the WSHP will cause the submergence and/or 
clearing of thousands of hectares of forests and shrub land that 
serve as carbon sinks.  It also acknowledges that the 
displacement of thousands of people affected by the dam may 
place increased pressure on forests in resettlement areas.68  The 
EIA, however, does not include any discussion of what options 
and assets Nepal may be foregoing by destroying and putting 
additional pressure on its carbon sinks given the added value of 
those lands in a world attempting to tackle the challenges of 
climate change.69 
 
 66. Many of these discussions have taken place pursuant to and in 
accordance with a 2007 decision reached by the Parties to the UNFCCC in Bali. 
That decision is entitled “Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing 
countries: approaches to stimulate action.” Decision 2/CP.13, at 8, FCCC/ 
CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008).  The Copenhagen Accord, taken note of by the 
UNFCCC Parties at their December 2009 meeting, further emphasized the need 
to incentivize protection of forests and established a fund, the Copenhagen 
Green Climate Fund, to help serve that goal. Copenhagen Accord, Decision 
2/CP.15, FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Dec. 18, 2009).   
 67. See, e.g., UNFCCC, GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE FOR LAND USE, LAND-USE 
CHANGE AND FORESTRY ACTIVITIES UNDER ARTICLE 3, PARAGRAPHS 3 AND 4, OF THE 
KYOTO PROTOCOL: DRAFT CONCLUSIONS PROPOSED BY THE CHAIR 7-11, FCCC/ 
SBSTA/2008/L.11 (June 12, 2008) (containing Parties’ suggestions regarding 
incentivizing forest conservation, including through provision of financial 
resources and payments); Yemi Katerere, A Climate Change Solution?, WORLD 
FINANCE 104-106 (May-June 2010) (discussing current and possible expanded 
future use of financial mechanisms to incentivize developing countries to 
conserve forest lands). 
 68. 2007 EIA, supra note 15, at 27-28. 
 69. See supra notes 67-68, 70; see generally EIA 2000, supra note 13; EIA 
2007, supra note 15; see also WINROCK INT’L NEPAL, THE POTENTIAL OF 
GENERATING CDM REVENUE FROM HYDROPOWER EXPORTED BY WEST SETI 
HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT: A FEASIBILITY STUDY REPORT (2006), http://www. 
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The EIA likewise fails to provide adequate information about 
the net impact that emissions generated by the project will have 
on Nepal’s GHG account.  Reservoirs such as WSHP emit 
methane (CH4), a GHG with twenty-one times the global warming 
potential70 of carbon dioxide.71  While the EIA briefly 
acknowledges that “some indirect greenhouse gas emissions [will] 
result from the decomposition of vegetation . . . inundated in the 
reservoir,”72 it does not appear to consider any of the methane 
emissions downstream of the reservoir though a “forming 
consensus is that [large dam] downstream . . . emissions might be 
responsible for a substantial release of CH4 to the atmosphere.”
73  
Yet, more fundamentally, the EIA dismisses the significance of 
those emissions from the reservoir that it does acknowledge by 
saying that such emissions are small when compared to the 
emissions India will purportedly avoid generating if it can import 
hydropower from the WSHP.74  This GHG accounting, however, 
which offsets the emissions generated by Nepal against the 
possible emissions reductions in India, is not consistent with the 
current design of international law governing GHG emissions.  
Under that framework, which holds each nation responsible for 
its own emissions,75 the EIA incorrectly characterizes the WSHP’s 
impacts on Nepal.76 
 
adb.org/Clean-Energy/documents/NEP-FS-West-Seti-Hydroelectric.pdf 
(discussing generally the loss of carbon sinks from the project). 
 70. U.S. EPA, Methane: Science, http://www.epa.gov/methane/scientific.html 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (a gas’s global warming potential is its relative 
ability to trap heat in the atmosphere). 
 71. 2000 EIA, supra note 13, at 32.  
 
From an environmental viewpoint, water-based energy generation may 
produce a very minor amount of air pollution, and thus makes a minor 
contribution to global warming in comparison to fossil fuel power 
generation. This is in line with Nepal's commitment to the Convention on 
Climate Change (1992), of which it is a signatory. 
 
Id.  
 72. Id. at 165. 
 73. Ivan B.T. Lima et al., Methane Emissions from Large Dams as 
Renewable Energy Resources:  A Developing Nation Perspective, 13 MITIG. 
ADAPT. STRAT. GLOB. CHANGE 193, 194 (2008). 
 74. 2000 EIA, supra note 13, at 165. 
 75. See generally UNFCCC, supra note 63 (discussing each nation’s duties 
with respect to its own emissions); Kyoto Protocol, supra note 64, art. 3, Annex 
B (imposing on countries the obligation to reduce their own emissions). There 
are mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol in which one country can receive 
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C. The Environmental and Economic Implications of 
Dam Decommissioning 
Factors such as the occurrence of major floods will hasten the 
rate of sedimentation and consequently shorten the project’s 
lifespan.77  Additionally, projected effects of climate change such 
as increased GLOFs and more intense monsoon storms may 
increase the rate of sediment accumulation in the reservoir, 
thereby reducing the amount of revenue the GoN can generate 
from the project.  Although possible effects exacerbated by 
climate change are directly relevant to analysis of the WSHP’s 
environmental and economic impacts, the EIA does not consider 
them.  But even more striking is the EIA’s silence on the 
environmental and economic impacts of dam decommissioning. 
Dam decommissioning is “the full or partial removal of an 
existing dam or its associated facilities or significant changes to 
the operations.”78  It can involve either “mothballing” the project 
(i.e., suspending all operations but maintaining the equipment in 
working conditions so that operation can be resumed), or 
abandoning it (i.e., stopping all operations, disposing of 
equipment and materials and essentially abandoning the site).79  
Based on the EIA’s conservative predictions regarding the rate of 
sediment deposition in the reservoir, decommissioning in the 
form of abandonment will likely be necessary for the WSHP 
within fifty years of the start of the project’s operation.80  By that 
time, the project will have been transferred to the GoN, which 
 
credits for reducing emissions in another country. Under one such mechanism, 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), it may be possible for Nepal to 
receive credits for reducing emissions in India. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 
64, art. 12 (defining the CDM). There are, however, certain criteria that a 
project must meet before it is eligible for CDM credits, including that the project 
supports sustainable development and that it represents “additional” emissions 
reductions that would otherwise not have occurred. No large dams have 
qualified for CDM credits. Moreover, even if they were to qualify for CDM 
credits, certain carbon markets such as the European Trading Scheme do not 
allow trading of credits generated from large hydropower projects such as the 
WSHP. See generally WINROCK INT’L NEPAL, supra note 69 (discussing the 
possibility of generating CDM credits from the WSHP). 
 76. 2000 EIA, supra note 13, at 166-67. 
 77. 2000 EIA, supra note 13, at 61-62. 
 78. PRELIMINARY DECOMMISSIONING PLAN, supra note 27, at 2. 
 79. Id. at 2. 
 80. Id. at 6-7. 
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will consequently bear full responsibility for “[p]reparation and 
implementation of [a] Detailed Decommissioning Plan.”81 
Although the EIA makes no mention of the economic, 
environmental, or technical issues associated with dam decomm-
issioning, a “Preliminary Decommissioning Plan” prepared by 
SMEC-WSHL provides an indication of the enormity of the 
decommissioning task.  Abandoning the project will require, 
among other actions, the GoN to develop and implement a plan to 
perform a hazard and risk assessment of dam stability; 
indefinitely perform monthly safety and stability inspections of 
the dam; indefinitely perform biannual inspections of the 
transmission line’s safety and stability; entomb the underground 
power station; de-energize the transmission line; remove and 
dispose of surface facilities or transfer them to local communities; 
remove and dispose of movable equipment and property, 
including hazardous materials likely to be present such as oil, 
grease, petroleum contaminated materials, batteries, and water 
treatment sludge; assess and mitigate impacts of 
decommissioning on the human uses and aquatic ecosystems of 
the reservoir and downstream water resources; prepare a budget 
for and fund decommissioning activities; and provide and train 
personnel to perform decommissioning tasks.82 
Those items suggest that the resources necessary to prepare 
and follow a Detailed Decommissioning Plan for the WSHP will 
be significant.  Yet the EIA makes no attempt to assess, quantify, 
or even discuss the possible or projected costs of this evidently 
inevitable aspect of the WSHP’s life cycle.  Its silence on the issue 
prevents the EIA from being able to offer an accurate portrayal of 
the project’s impacts. 
IV. RIGHTS VIOLATIONS ARISING OUT OF THE 
WSHP AND ITS INADEQUATE EIA 
The EIA prepared for the WSHP fails to address the impacts 
of climate change on the project, the project’s impacts on GHG 
emissions, and the myriad issues related to decommissioning the 
project.  These omissions present a misleading view of the project 
by ignoring fundamental risks to its economic viability, 
 
 81. Id. at 2. 
 82. Id. at 2-11. 
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environmental impacts, and long-term consequences for the 
people of Nepal.  The ignored impacts of climate change on the 
project could terminate the project’s useful life earlier than 
expected, thereby decreasing the amount of revenue to be 
generated by the project for the GoN, and leaving the people of 
Nepal with a massive structure for which they may owe 
significant debts and be perpetually liable.  Climate change 
impacts could also change the EIA’s assumptions about the water 
quality in the reservoir and downstream of the dam, with possible 
negative—but unexplored—social and environmental impacts. 
Due to the centrality of the omitted information to an 
assessment of the costs and benefits of the WSHP, approval of the 
project based on the deficient EIA violates the rights of Nepalese 
people to information, to social justice, and to a clean 
environment—rights that are enshrined in the Nepalese 
constitution and supported and informed by international law.  
The parties responsible for these violations include the GoN, 
which approved the EIA in breach of its duties to protect its 
citizens and the environment; the ADB, which is financially 
supporting the project in violation of its own internal policies, 
international baseline standards of conduct for financial 
institutions, and its obligation under international law to respect 
the human rights of those affected by its actions; and 
SMEC/SMEC-WSHL, the private proponents of the project who 
are responsible for preparing the deficient EIA and whose actions 
are inconsistent with their duties to respect human rights and 
their obligations under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises (Guidelines).83  There are, however, mechanisms for 
holding these actors to account.  In order to advocate efforts to do 
so, this section first argues more specifically how the WSHP and 
its deficient EIA violate the human rights of Nepali people.  The 
following section then suggests strategies advocates can use to 
cure these violations and seek accountability.  Throughout the 
 
 83. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. (OECD), OECD GUIDELINES FOR 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 19 (2000), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/ 
1922428.pdf; see also John Ruggie, Promotion and Protection of all Human 
Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the 
Right to Development: Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business 
and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (discussing “the State 
duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including 
business; [and] the corporate responsibility to respect human rights”). 
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discussion, it must also be kept in mind that the strategies 
advocated do not mean to be an anti-development or “No-Dam” 
campaign per se, but a “No-Bad-Development” campaign 
designed to ensure compliance with principles of informed 
sustainable development.84 
 A. The Right to Information 
Article 27 of Nepal’s Interim Constitution specifically 
guarantees a right to information, stating that a fundamental 
right of every citizen is “the right to demand or obtain 
information on any matters of his/her own or of public 
importance.”85  This right—fulfillment of which is often described 
as a precondition to exercise other fundamental human rights86—
is similarly recognized by States worldwide,87 emphasized in a 
host of international agreements and declarations,88 and 
elaborated upon through judicial decisions.89  It is, as the United 
 
 84. See Dipak Gyawali, Epilogue, in THE NEPAL-INDIA WATER RESOURCES 
RELATIONSHIP:  CHALLENGES, 295, 300 (Dwarika N. Dhunkel & Santa B. Pun 
eds., 2009). As opposed to,  
 
Euro-American and environmental activists, whose concerns lie more in 
stopping excess development of water structures, Nepali activists . . . are 
more concerned with stopping bad developments but promoting good 
ones. Indeed, given that much of the population in the Southern 
countries still do not have access to electricity, clean drinking water, 
basic flood protection and reliable irrigation, storage and diversion dams 
have to be built:  the debate in the South is really about how good ones 
can be built and bad ones avoided.  This has been expressed as the slogan 
of ‘No Bad Dams!’ rather than ‘No Dams’ of the northern NGOs. 
 
Id.  
 85. INTERIM CONST. OF NEPAL art. 27 (2007). 
 86. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. 
 87. Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Transparency, Participation and 
Accountability in International Economic Dispute Settlement:  A Sustainable 
Development Perspective, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL AND 
NATIONAL LAW 321, 328 (Hans Christian Bugge & Christina Voigt eds., 2008) 
(stating that as of 2006, at least sixty-eight countries had enacted laws 
protecting freedom of information). 
 88. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19, 
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe, 38 I.L.M, 517 (enacted 2001). 
 89. See, e.g., Öneryildiz v. Turkey, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 20 ¶ 62 (2004) (Grand 
Chamber) (stating that in certain cases involving dangerous activities, “public 
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Nations General Assembly recognized in its first session in 1946, 
“a fundamental right and . . . the touchstone of all freedoms to 
which the United Nations is consecrated.”90  Likewise, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
affirms both the right to “seek, receive and impart information” 
and the role of that right as an essential component of another 
key element of democracy, the right to freedom of expression.91 
The right is further recognized as being integral to 
environmental protection and sustainable development.92  
Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration adopted at the 1992 United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) 
emphasizes that because “[e]nvironmental issues are best 
handled with the participation of all concerned citizens . . . [a]t 
the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access 
to information concerning the environment that is held by public 
authorities.”93  Agenda 21, also adopted at UNCED, elaborates on 
the importance of the right to sustainable development: 
  
[I]n the specific context of environment and development, 
the need for new forms of participation has emerged.  This 
includes a need for individuals, groups and organizations to 
participate in environmental impact assessment 
procedures, and to know about and participate in decisions, 
particularly those that potentially affect the communities in 
which they live and work.  Individuals, groups and 
organizations should have access to information relevant to 
environment and development held by national authorities, 
 
access to clear and full information is viewed as a basic human right” in 
Europe). 
 90. G.A. Res. I/59, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/I/59 (Dec. 14, 2006). 
 91. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19 (stating 
“[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include 
freedom to seek, receive and impart information . . ..”). 
 92. See generally NEIL CRAIK, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT:  PROCESS, SUBSTANCE AND INTEGRATION 77-82 (2008) 
(discussing the links between access to information, EIAs, and sustainable 
development). 
 93. U.N. Conference on Env’t & Dev., Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1, 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992) [hereinafter 
Rio Declaration]. 
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including information on . . . activities that have or are 
likely to have a significant impact on the environment. . ..94 
 
Refining and strengthening these principles, more than forty 
countries have ratified the Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention), which establishes 
minimum standards countries must comply with to, among other 
obligations, guarantee and protect their citizens’ rights of access 
to information.95  The Aarhus Convention details “passive” 
government obligations—i.e., obligations to respond to requests 
for information—and “active” obligations—i.e., obligations to 
obligations to collect, update, and disseminate information.96  
Likewise, the UNFCCC, to which Nepal is a party, contains 
“active” obligations to collect and disseminate information 
relating to global warming, stating that “Parties shall . . . [t]ake 
climate change considerations into account . . . in their relevant 
social, economic and environmental policies and actions . . . [and] 
[p]romote and facilitate . . . public access to information on 
climate change and its effects.”97 
 
 94. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, ¶ 23.2 
(1992) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Agenda 21].  See also Case Concerning 
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) (Judgment of April 20, 
2010) ¶¶ 203-205 (stating that preparation of environmental impact 
assessments in certain circumstances is now a requirement under international 
law). 
 95. Convention on Access to Info. & U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Eur., Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters, June 25, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 517; see also Benjamin W. Cramer, The 
Human Right to Information, the Environment and Information about the 
Environment:  From the Universal Declaration to the Aarhus Convention, 14 
COMM. L. & POL’Y 73 (2009) (discussing the Aarhus Convention). 
 96. U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Eur., Aarhus Convention: Convention on Access 
to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters: Content of the Convention: Access to Information, 
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/contentofaarhus.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2009). 
 97. UNFCCC, supra note 63, art. 6(a)(ii); see also id. art. 4(i) (stating that 
Parties “shall . . . [p]romote and cooperate in education, training and public 
awareness related to climate change and encourage the widest participation in 
this process, including that of non-governmental organizations”); Kyoto Protocol, 
supra note 64, art. 10(e) (stating that each Party “shall . . . facilitate at the 
national level public awareness of, and public access to information on, climate 
change.”). 
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These connections between the right to information, 
environmental protection, and sustainable development are 
similarly evident in the domestic laws of Nepal, which give 
content to the right to information in the environmental context 
through its rules regarding assessment of and disclosure of 
information in EIAs.98  Pursuant to the Environment Protection 
Rules, 1997, proponents of projects meeting certain thresholds 
(e.g., mining projects requiring relocation or resettlement of more 
than 100 people, or hydropower projects capable of generating 
more than 5 megawatts) must collect and publicly disclose 
information relating to technical, geographic, environmental, 
economic, social, cultural, and physical aspects of the proposals, 
including possible direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of the 
project, both positive and negative.99  The information must also 
describe impacts over the short, medium and long-term, discuss 
consequences of non-implementation of the project, explain 
options for reducing environmental impacts, and provide 
references supporting its contents.100  The scope of EIAs—and, 
therefore, the information to be automatically disclosed to the 
public regarding covered projects—is broad. 
Domestic environmental laws and Nepal’s obligations under 
relevant international law such as the UNFCCC thus entitle 
Nepalese citizens to receive an EIA of the WSHP that fairly 
discloses its impacts, and that includes information about the 
effects of climate change.101  The EIA upon which the WSHP’s 
approval has been based, however, fails to meet those criteria; 
and the crucial information it omits renders the information it 
 
 98. See generally CRAIK, supra note 92, at 77-82 (discussing the links 
between access to information, EIAs, and sustainable development in 
international law). 
 99. Environment Protection Rules, 1997, Schedule 6, Matters to be 
Mentioned While Preparing Reports Relating to Environmental Impact 
Assessment, available at http://www.unep.org/bpsp/EIA/Case%20Studies/NE 
PAL%20%28EIA%29.pdf (Schedule 6 to the Environmental Protection Rules of 
1997 is available on pages 71-72 of this document). 
 100. Id. 
 101. For a discussion of how the law has evolved to incorporate climate change 
issues into environmental impact assessments, see CRAIK, supra note 92, at 212-
15. The developments Craik discusses in Canada can also be seen in the United 
States. See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, Climate Change and the Environmental 
Review Process, 22 NAT’L RESOURCES & ENV’T 20 (Winter 2008) (discussing 
developments in the United States regarding using the impact assessment 
process to address climate change issues); see also supra note 35. 
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does present about the economic and environmental impacts of 
the project misleading.102  As the content of the right to 
information has evolved and been informed by principles of 
sustainable development,103 governments’ responsibilities to 
protect the rights of its citizens,104 and third-parties’ obligations to 
do no harm,105 the right to information now can be seen as 
imposing on governments active obligations to ensure the 
dissemination of accurate information.  When government 
officials are responsible for reviewing and approving documents 
such as EIAs, this “active” interpretation of the right to 
information means they have a duty to ensure the information 
provided is—at a minimum—not facially misleading.  This 
obligation is especially strong in the cases when those most 
impacted by major development projects are traditionally 
marginalized and oppressed groups who face significant hurdles 
in taking independent steps to seek and obtain relevant 
information.  To read the content of the right to information 
otherwise would essentially render the right meaningless in 
circumstances when its guarantees are likely needed most. 
Consequently, by approving the deficient EIA, SMEC-WSHL, 
the GoN and ADB violated the rights of the people of Nepal to 
information regarding the development of a massive 
infrastructure project. 
 
 102. See infra Part II. 
 103. See generally supra notes 91-97. 
 104. See, e.g., John Ruggie, Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, 
Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to 
Development: Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and 
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5, ¶ 5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (“[T]he State duty to 
protect . . . lies at the very core of the international human rights regime.”); 
Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the Issue of 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises, John Ruggie, Addendum: State Obligations to Provide Access to 
Remedy for Human Rights Abuses by Third Parties, Including Business: An 
Overview of International and Regional Provisions, Commentary and Decisions, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/13/Add.1, ¶ 2 (May 15, 2009) (“The State duty to protect is 
grounded in international human rights law. Guidance from international 
human rights bodies suggests that the duty applies to all recognized rights that 
private parties are capable of impairing and to all types of business 
enterprises.”). 
 105. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 51-81 (discussing transnational corporations’ duties to 
respect human rights). 
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 B. The Right to Public Participation and Social Justice 
Related to and dependent upon the right to information, is 
the right to public participation in decision-making.106  That right, 
as enshrined in Article 21 of Nepal’s Interim Constitution, 
guarantees groups such as women, indigenous tribes, and poor 
peasants and laborers “who are economically, socially or 
educationally backward . . . the right to participate in the state 
mechanism on the basis of proportional inclusive principles.”107  
Like the right to information, various international texts, treaties 
and judicial decisions affirm this right of citizens to participate in 
decision-making, and further emphasize the importance of 
ensuring that traditionally marginalized groups such as women, 
racial minorities, and indigenous peoples are accorded adequate 
participatory opportunities.  These texts and decisions also link 
the right to participate with the principle of sustainable 
development, treating the former as being instrumental to and 
necessary for achievement of the latter. 
The World Charter for Nature, a 1982 resolution of the 
United Nations General Assembly, states the general principle, 
declaring that “[a]ll persons in accordance with their national 
legislation, shall have the opportunity to participate, individually 
or with others, in the formulation of decisions of direct concern to 
their environment.”108  The United Nations resolution on the 
Declaration on the Right to Development, passed by the General 
Assembly in 1986, indicates that States should do more than 
simply permit participation, but “should [also] encourage popular 
participation in all spheres as an important factor in 
development.”109  The Declaration on the Right to Development 
further proclaims that “States have the right and the duty to 
formulate” their national development plans “on the basis of 
[their populations’] active, free and meaningful participation.”110 
 
 106. Dinah Shelton, Environmental Rights, in PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 185, 203 
(Philip Alston ed., 2001). 
 107. INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF NEPAL art. 21 (2007). 
 108. World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 37/7, Principle 23, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 
(Oct. 28, 1982). 
 109. Declaration on the Right to Development, U.N. G.A. Res. 41/128, art. 8(2) 
(Dec. 14, 1986) (emphasis added). 
 110. Id. art. 2(3). 
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The Rio Declaration similarly acknowledges a right to 
participation, and links it with principles of sustainable 
development.  It appears to go beyond the Declaration on the 
Right to Development’s suggestion that States “should encourage” 
public participation, stating instead that “each individual shall 
have . . . the opportunity to participate in decision-making 
processes,” and that “States shall facilitate and encourage public . 
. . participation by making information widely available.”111 
The Rio Declaration also specifically addresses participatory 
rights of vulnerable or frequently marginalized groups, 
emphasizing in Principles 20, 21, and 22, respectively, the 
importance of ensuring women, the youth, and indigenous people 
are able to participate in decision-making in order to achieve 
sustainable development.112  The Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women likewise stresses 
the need for government to take affirmative steps to guarantee 
equal and widespread enjoyment of participatory rights, 
requiring “States Parties . . . to ensure to . . . women [in rural 
areas] the right [t]o participate in the elaboration and 
implementation of development planning at all levels.”113  The 
ILO Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries contains numerous provision requiring 
State Parties to consult with and ensure the participation of 
indigenous groups in a wide range of contexts relating to land and 
resource use and development planning.114 
 
 111. Rio Declaration, supra note 93, princ. 10 (emphasis added). 
 112. Id. princs. 20-22. 
 113. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, art. 14(2)(a), 1249 U.N.T.S. 513 (Dec. 18, 1979). 
 114. See, e.g., ILO Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries, ILO Conv. No. 169, 72 ILO Official Bull. 59, art. 6(1)(a) 
(June 27, 1989) (requiring governments to “consult the peoples concerned . . .  
whenever consideration is being given to legislative or administrative measures 
which may affect them directly”); id. art. 6(1)(b) (stating governments should 
“establish means by which [indigenous] peoples can freely participate, to at least 
the same extent as other sectors of the population, at all levels of decision-
making in the elective institutions and administrative and other bodies 
responsible for policies and programmes which concern them”); id. art. 7(1) 
(“The peoples concerned . . . shall participate in the formulation, implementation 
and evaluation of plans and programmes for national and regional development 
which may affect them directly.”). 
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With respect to climate change in particular, the UNFCCC 
declares that State Parties shall “encourage the widest 
participation” in the process of addressing climate change.115  
Again, one mechanism for ensuring realization of the right to 
public participation that is both codified by Nepal’s domestic 
legislation and promoted in international texts is the use of 
environmental impact statements.116 
Nepal’s Environment Protection Rules, 1997, which form part 
of the country’s strategy to fulfill the objectives of Agenda 21 and 
to “empower local bodies, women, indigenous people, and dalits117 
to participate in the mainstream of development,”118 contain 
provisions requiring involvement of the public in preparation of 
EIAs and allowing them to review EIAs’ findings.  Those rules, 
more specifically, obligate project proponents to provide 
opportunities for “concerned individuals and institutions” to 
comment on the scope of an impending EIA, and to attend and 
make comments at hearings regarding the impacts of the 
proposed project.119 
As noted in the EIA, the FWDR where the WSHP is located 
is one of the least developed and poorest regions of the country, 
with low rates of literacy and high rates of landlessness, 
rendering many households and communities in the region 
particularly vulnerable to impacts of the project such as loss of 
private and communal property, and disrupted or severed access 
 
 115. UNFCCC, supra note 63, art. 4(1)(i). 
 116. See, e.g., Rio Declaration, supra note 93, princs. 10, 17; Agenda 21, supra 
note 94, ch. 23, pmbl., ¶ 23.2. 
 117. SMEC-WSHL describes the term “Dalit” in Vulnerable Community 
Development Plan as follows:  
 
In Nepal, the term Dalit traditionally connotes the untouchables, low 
castes and castes from whom water is not accepted and whose touch 
requires purification by the ‘holy water’. Of late, this term has also been 
used to refer to the disadvantaged, downtrodden, marginalized and 
oppressed groups. Dalit is not a homogeneous group, and its 
heterogeneity extends to language, religion and culture.  
 
SMEC-WSHL, Vulnerable Community Development Plan: Main Report, at 28 
(Oct. 2008), available at http://www.wsh.com.np/documents/. 
 118. Nepal Ministry of Env’t, Sci. & Tech., World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (Rio+10) National Assessment Report 2002: Nepal, http://www. 
most.gov.np/en/environment/devassessment.php (last visited Apr. 30, 2009). 
 119. Environment Protection Rules, 1997, Chapter 2, Initial Environmental 
Examination and Environmental Impact Assessment, ¶¶ 4, 7. 
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to social services and connections.120  Of these vulnerable groups, 
Dalit and female-headed households in the region are considered 
to be especially exposed to project-induced disruptions.121  Efforts 
to facilitate and encourage effective participation, therefore, must 
take these considerations into account by, for example, presenting 
and accepting information orally well as through written 
exchanges. 
Some non-governmental organizations who have interviewed 
people living in FWDR, however, report that participatory rights 
are not being respected: local citizens describe not having access 
to the EIA, being denied requests for information about 
environmental impacts of the project, and being precluded from 
providing their comments regarding the project.122  The problem, 
however, is even more basic than that in that even if the 
information contained in the EIA were disclosed in writing and 
through meetings in local languages, the residents would 
nevertheless still be denied the ability to meaningfully participate 
in analysis and development of the project because of the EIA’s 
significant omissions.123  Real participation depends on having 
access to relevant information.124  As prepared by SMEC-WSHL 
and approved by the GoN and ADB, however, the EIA only 
superficially permits participation.125  Such participation does not 
satisfy the rights of participation guaranteed under the Nepali 
Constitution and informed by domestic and international law. 
 
 120. SMEC-WSHL, supra note 117, at ix-2; see also 2000 EIA, supra note 13, 
at 93-114. 
 121. SMEC-WSHL, supra note 117, at ix-2. 
 122. See JAPAN CENTER FOR A SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY, REPORT 
ON THE WEST SETI HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT AND ADB POLICY VIOLATIONS 
(Version 2) (2007), available at http://www.jacses.org/sdap/westseti/JACSES_ 
Report_on_West_Seti.pdf. 
 123. See infra Part II. 
 124. See generally Rio Declaration, supra note 93, princ. 10 (stating that 
“States shall facilitate and encourage public . . . participation by making 
information widely available”); Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth, Introduction: 
The Spread of Liberal Democracy and Its Implications for International Law, in 
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 14 (Gregory H. Fox & 
Brad R. Roth eds., 2000) (stating that “‘the proper conditions’ for the exercise of 
popular will” are that choices be “genuinely knowing (based on good 
information), willing (not merely a choice among options imposed by the will of 
elites or by circumstance), and intelligent (taken in circumstances that allow for 
proper reflection)). 
 125. See infra Part II. 
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C. The Right to a Clean Environment 
Article 16 of Nepal’s Interim Constitution grants “[e]very 
person . . . the right to live in a clean environment.”126  Seemingly 
indeterminate, this broad right also gains content through 
reference to other rights and obligations under domestic Nepali 
law and principles of international law. 
More specifically, government abdications of statutory duties 
to protect the environment can give rise to a breach of the right to 
a clean environment.127  Similarly, violations of other often 
complementary rights as “rights to life, association, expression, 
information, political participation, personal liberty, equality and 
legal redress . . . can be and have been invoked to further 
environmental goals,” and thus can be cited to establish a 
violation of the right to a clean environment.128 
Another important candidate source of guidance for the 
interpretation of the right are the “Responsibilities, Directive 
Principles and Policies of the State” enshrined in Part Four of the 
Interim Constitution.129  Among the relevant responsibilities and 
principles are those providing that the “State shall” (1) “make 
necessary arrangements to maintain [a] clean environment,” (2) 
“give priority to the protection of the environment, and also to the 
prevention [of] its further damage due to physical development 
activities,” (3) make provisions for the “protection of the forest, 
vegetation and biodiversity [and] its sustainable use, and for 
equitable distribution of the benefits derived from it,”130 and (4) 
 
 126. INTERIM CONST. OF NEPAL art. 16 (2007). 
 127. See, e.g., Advocate Prakash Mani Sharma for Pro Pub. v. His Majesty 
Gov’t Cabinet Secretariat and others, WP 2991/1995 (June 9, 1997), available at 
http://www.elaw.org/node/1391 (citing government breaches of statutory duties 
in support of its holding that the government was not fulfilling with its 
obligations to protect the environment). 
 128. Shelton, supra note 106, at 218. 
 129. INTERIM CONST. OF NEPAL pt. 4 (2007). Although the Interim Constitution 
specifies that these responsibilities, principles, and policies do not create any 
enforceable rights, the Supreme Court of Nepal has held that such 
constitutionally enshrined guidelines nevertheless have meaning for evaluating 
whether government actions are valid, and can be given effect through court 
order. Advocate Prakash Mani Sharma for Pro Pub. v. His Majesty Gov’t. 
Cabinet Secretariat & Others, WP 2991/1995 (June 9, 1997), available at 
http://www.elaw.org/node/1391. 
 130. INTERIM CONST. OF NEPAL art. 35(5) (2007) (emphasis added). 
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“use existing natural resources including water resources of the 
country for the interest of the nation.”131 
International law regarding the scope and content of the 
right to a clean environment is also instructive.  Because the 
GoN’s actions are inconsistent with its obligations under the 
UNFCCC to “[t]ake climate change considerations into account . . 
. in [its] relevant social, economic and environmental policies and 
actions,” with the ICCPR’s guarantees of rights to life, liberty and 
security of person,132 and with the Rio Declaration’s principle that 
States must fulfill their development goals “so as to equitably 
meet developmental and environmental needs of present and 
future generations,” such actions are also inconsistent with 
Nepali citizens’ rights to a clean environment. 
Based on these principles, the approval of the WSHP—a 
project which will inundate thousands of hectares of land, involve 
the relocation of thousands of people, and will consume the 
limited resources of the GoN, and yet which, due to the EIA’s 
failure to evaluate the impacts of climate change or evaluate the 
entire life of the project, likely has significant unknown but major 
environmental and economic implications for present and future 
generations of Nepali people—violates the right to a clean 
environment set forth in the Interim Constitution. 
 
 131. Id. art. 33(o). 
 132. Several national and international courts have held that the right to life, 
liberty, and/or security is infringed in certain cases involving environmental 
harm. The Federal High Court of Nigeria, for example, held that multinational 
oil companies violated “fundamental rights to life (including healthy 
environment) and dignity of human person” by flaring gas. Gbemre v. Shell 
Petroleum Dev. Co. Nig. Ltd., No. FHC/B/CS/53/05, at 30 (F.H.C. Nov. 14, 2005), 
available at http://www.climatelaw.org/cases/case-documents/nigeria/ni-shell-
nov05-judgment.pdf. The European Court of Human Rights, in a 1995 decision, 
found that the petitioner’s rights to privacy and family security were violated by 
the Spanish government’s failure to “strik[e] a fair balance between the interest 
of the town’s economic well-being—that of having a waste-treatment plant—and 
the applicant’s effective enjoyment of her right to respect for her home and 
private family life.” Lopez Ostra v. Spain, 20 Eur. Ct. H.R. 277, ¶¶ 6, 44 (1995).  
For a discussion of these and additional cases, see Svitlana Kravchenko, Right 
to Carbon or Right to Life:  Human Rights Approaches to Climate Change, 9 VT. 
J. ENVT’L L. 513 (2008). 
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V. POSSIBLE MECHANISMS FOR ADDRESSING 
VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS CAUSED BY 
THE WSHP 
Various actors are involved in pursuing development of the 
WSHP, and also play a consequent role in infringing the rights of 
the Nepali people to information, social justice, and a clean 
environment.  There exist, however, promising mechanisms to 
seek accountability for at least three of these key players: the 
GoN, SMEC/SMEC-WSHL, and the ADB. 
 A.  Pursuing Public Interest Litigation in Nepal 
In Nepal, citizens can seek to hold their government 
accountable for violations of Articles 16, 21, and 27 by filing a 
public interest action under Article 107 of the Interim 
Constitution.  The provision states: 
 
The Supreme Court shall, for the enforcement of the 
fundamental rights conferred by this Constitution, for the 
enforcement of any other legal right for which no other 
remedy has been provided or for which the remedy even 
though provided appears to be inadequate or ineffective, or 
for the settlement of any constitutional or legal question 
involved in any dispute of public interest or concern, have 
the extraordinary power to issue necessary and appropriate 
orders to enforce such rights or settle the dispute. For these 
purposes, the Supreme Court may, with a view to imparting 
full justice and providing the appropriate remedy, issue 
appropriate orders and writs including the writs of habeas 
corpus, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition and quo 
warranto.133   
 
The Supreme Court of Nepal has interpreted this provision to 
grant broad rights of standing;134 and public interest groups have 
 
 133. INTERIM CONST. OF NEPAL art. 107(2) (2007). 
 134. See, e.g., Advocate Prakash Mani Sharma for Pro Pub. v. His Majesty 
Gov’t. Cabinet Secretariat & Others, WP 2991/1995 (1997), available at 
http://www.elaw.org/node/1391 (holding that the petitioner had standing to 
bring an action to enforce a principle set forth under Part Four of the 
Constitution); Suray Prasad Sharma Dhungel v. Godavari Marble Industries & 
Others, WP 35/1992 (Oct. 31, 1995), available at http://www.elaw.org/node/1849 
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accordingly successfully exploited the opportunities afforded by 
that provision to enforce human rights, including the right to 
information regarding a dam development project135 and the right 
to a clean environment.136  Based on these prior successes, one 
advisable strategy would be for public interest groups challenging 
the implementation of the WSHP to file an action seeking to halt 
the project and obtain an order compelling the GoN to require 
SMEC-WSHL to prepare an adequate EIA. 
 B. Filing a Petition with the National Human Rights 
Commission in Nepal 
A second strategy targeting the GoN is to file a petition with 
the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), arguing, like 
the petition to the Supreme Court would, that the GoN’s approval 
of the deficient EIA violates the rights of Nepali people to 
information, social justice, and a clean environment.  The NHRC, 
which was established under the Interim Constitution in 2007 in 
order to fill the role of a body compliant with the so-called “Paris 
Principles,”137 has a broad mandate to promote and protect 
human rights in the country, powers to conduct inquiries and 
investigations on its own initiative or in response to a petition or 
 
(holding that petitioner environmental groups had standing to bring an action to 
enforce the right to a clean environment as part of the right to life). These cases 
were brought under a similar provision in the prior version of the Nepali 
Constitution. 
 135. See, e.g., Himalayan and Peninsular Hydro-Ecological Network, 
Successful Campaigning Against Large Dams: The Shelving of Arun III, 
http://www.bothends.info/service/ip-dam.htm#successful (last visited Apr. 30, 
2010) (describing the case in which NGOs prevailed in an action to seek 
information regarding the development of the proposed so-called “Arun III” 201 
MW hydropower project); Alfred Escher, World Bank Withdraws from Arun III 
Project at Inspection Panel’s Recommendation, 3 HUM. RIGHTS BRIEF 1 (1995), 
available at www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/v3i1/wldbnk31.htm. 
 136. See, e.g., Suray Prasad Sharma Dhungel v. Godavari Marble Indus. & 
Others, WP 35/1992 (Oct. 31, 1995), available at http://www.elaw.org/node/1849. 
 137. The “Paris Principles” are the Principles relating to the Status of 
National Institutions, adopted by United Nations General Assembly in a 
December 1993 resolution. National Institutions for the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 48/134, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/134 
(Dec. 20, 1993). The Paris Principles set forth model guidelines for the 
establishment, role, responsibilities, operation and authority of national 
institutions “vested with competence to promote and protect human rights.” Id. 
¶ 1. 
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complaint, and the authority to make recommendations for action 
against the perpetrator and/or the officials who negligently or 
recklessly failed to prevent the rights violations.138  In performing 
its functions, the NHRC can “exercise the same powers as the 
court . . . in requiring any person to appear before [it] for 
recording his/her statement[,] . . . receiving and examining 
evidence, [and] ordering . . . the production of any physical 
proof.”139 
In the year from July 2007 to June 2008, the NHRC received 
1,137 complaints alleging various human rights abuses, including 
killing, abduction, torture, property seizure, and violations of 
economic, social and cultural rights.140  It investigated 728 cases, 
and issued recommendations or settled 459.141  It also “[h]eld over 
a dozen . . . dialogues with . . . senior officials of [the GoN]” and 
with “heads of some corporations . . . on the issues various rights 
such [the] right to life, right to movement, economic and social 
rights, [and] rights of prisoners.”142  It is thus active, but with a 
workload that might prevent a prompt response.  Nevertheless, 
due to the NHRC’s position as an independent body capable of 
inquiring into the actions of other government officials, its broad 
powers, and its ability to issue remedial orders, a petition to it 
detailing the violations resulting from the submission and 
approval of the WSHP’s EIA could be an effective way to halt the 
project to require preparation of a revised EIA.143 
 
 138. In 2000, the NHRC was established as a statutory body under the 
Human Rights Commission Act 1997. Part 15 of the Interim Constitution 
converted it into an independent constitutional body, and now defines its role 
and responsibilities. National Human Rights Commission (Nepal), About Us, 
http://www.nhrcnepal.org/about_us.php (last visited Apr. 23, 2010); INTERIM 
CONST. OF NEPAL pt. 15 (2007). 
 139. INTERIM CONST. OF NEPAL pt. 15, art. 132(3)(i) (2007). 
 140. NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (NEPAL), ANNUAL PROGRESS 
REPORT (JULY 2007-JUNE 2008) 1 (2008), available at http://www.nhrc 
nepal.org/publication/doc/reports/Annual-Report-Eng-2007-08.pdf. Many of 
these cases arose of out of the conflict between the GoN and the Communist 
Party of Nepal—Maoist, see generally id. 
 141. Id. at 1. 
 142. Id. at 15. 
 143. Through email correspondence with Nepali activists on human rights and 
water issues, I learned that they had not pursued filing a complaint with the 
NHRC because the NHRC’s work had previously been limited to investigation of 
civil and political rights. The NHRC now, however, also investigates claims of 
violations of economic, social and cultural rights. Moreover, even if the NHRC’s 
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 C. Filing a Request for Consultation and Compliance 
Review with the ADB 
Petitions to the Supreme Court of Nepal and the NHRC 
could, in connection with addressing rights’ violations facilitated 
by the GoN’s approval of a deficient EIA, seek remedies that stop 
the infringing conduct of third parties such as the ADB and 
SMEC-WSHL.  An order by either the Supreme Court or NHRC 
ordering the government to require a new EIA prior to any 
further progress on the WSHP would effectively require those 
non-GoN entities to take action to cure the violations.  Yet in 
addition to those indirect routes, there are other avenues 
available to address the actions of the ADB and SMEC-WSHL 
parties more directly.  One such avenue, which aims at the 
actions of the ADB in approving the WSHP, is to file a request for 
consultation and compliance with the ADB. 
In order to respond to increasing scrutiny by governments 
and civil society, and a “shift in development models toward 
sustainable development,” the ADB, like other multinational 
development banks, began in the 1980s to develop social and 
environmental policies and accountability mechanisms.144  As a 
result of further development of those efforts, the ADB has 
instituted a “consultation” mechanism allowing individuals (or 
their representatives) to file complaints alleging that they have, 
or are likely to be, directly and materially adversely affected by 
an ADB-assisted project, and that the harm is related to an act or 
omission of the ADB arising out of its role in the project.145  If the 
complaint is eligible,146 the ADB and the complainants will then 
 
mandate or focus were limited, it could still review this issue given that, as I 
argue in this paper, the rights violations can also be characterized as violations 
of civil and political rights. 
 144. ASIAN DEV. BANK, REVIEW OF THE INSPECTION FUNCTION:  ESTABLISHMENT 
OF A NEW ADB ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISM, at II (2003), available at 
www.adb.org/documents/policies/ADB_accountability_mechanism/ADB_account
ability_mechanism.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2010). 
 145. Id. at 17-18. 
 146. Ineligible requests for consultations include those that: (1) are not related 
to an act or omission of the ADB; (2) relate to procurement; (3) involve 
allegations of fraud or corruption; (4) involve completed projects; (5) have 
already been considered (unless there is new evidence); (6) challenge the 
adequacy or suitability of an internal ADB policy or procedure; (7) are frivolous, 
(8) relate to personnel matters; or (9) involve non-operational issues such as 
finance and administration. Id. See also Asian Dev. Bank, The Office of the 
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engage in a “Consultation Process” in an attempt to identify 
solutions to the identified problems.147  Once the consultation 
request is filed, the complainants may also file a request for 
“compliance review.”148  This mechanism is a separate system 
designed specifically to address the ADB’s violations of its own 
policies and procedures.149 
Requests for consultation and/or compliance review in the 
case of the WSHP could raise issues alleging, for example, that 
the ADB negligently approved a misleading EIA, or that its 
approval of the EIA was inconsistent with its internal policies 
regarding environmental impact assessments and dissemination 
of information and meaningful involvement of stakeholders.  It 
could also argue that the ADB’s approval of the EIA violated 
baseline standards set forth in the Equator Principles150 (which 
were launched by the World Bank and International Finance 
Corporation and have since been widely adopted by financial 
institutions worldwide)151 instructing lenders to ensure that, 
among other tasks, borrowers have: (1) performed an “adequate, 
accurate, and objective evaluation and presentation”152 of the 
“social and environmental impacts, risks, and opportunities of 
projects”153 for key areas of the project’s life-cycle from pre-
 
Special Project Facilitator Consultation Primer:  Procedure for Complaint 
Handling, http://www.adb.org/SPF/default.asp (last visited May 1, 2009), 
[hereinafter Asian Dev. Bank, Consultation Primer]. 
 147. Asian Dev. Bank, The Consultation Phase of ADB’s Accountability 
Mechanism, http://www.adb.org/SPF/default.asp (last visited May 1, 2009). 
 148. Id. See also Asian Dev. Bank, Consultation Primer, supra note 146, at 8-
11. 
 149. See Asian Dev. Bank, Consultation Primer, supra note 146, at 8-11. 
 150. The Equator Principles: A Benchmark for the Financial Industry  to 
Manage Social and Environmental Issues in Project Financing, http://www. 
equator-principles.com./ (last visited May 1, 2010). 
 151. Katinka Jesse & Marie-Jose van der Heijden, Corporate Environmental 
Accountability as a Means for Intragenerational Equity; ‘Hidden’ Environmental 
Impacts in the North-South Conflict, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN 
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL LAW 346 (2008) (describing the Equator Principles 
and noting that over fifty private international operating banks had volunteered 
to adhere to them). 
 152. INT’L FIN. CORP., PERFORMANCE STANDARD I:  SOCIAL AND ENVIRON-
MENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 2 (2006), http://www.ifc.org/ 
ifcext/sustainability.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/pol_PerformanceStandards2006_fu
ll/$FILE/IFC+Performance+Standards.pdf. 
 153. Id. at i. 
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construction, through operation, to decommissioning or closure;154 
and (2) “effective[ly engaged the] community. . .  through 
disclosure of project-related information and consultation with 
local communities on matters that directly affect them.”155 
Such petitions to development banks have proven to be 
useful advocacy strategies in analogous contexts.  Indeed, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) in Nepal had significant 
success with this strategy when challenging the development of 
another large dam, the proposed 201 MW Arun III project, in the 
mid-1990s.156  Several NGOs filed a petition with the World 
Bank’s newly created Inspection Panel, arguing that the bank 
had violated its internal regulations in supporting the project.  
The Inspection Panel conducted an investigation and found that 
World Bank policies had in fact been violated in connection with 
the Arun III project.157  After receiving the Inspection Panel’s 
report, the President of the World Bank decided to withdraw the 
bank’s support from Arun III.158 
Given the rights and policy violations in the case of the 
proposed WSHP, a similar petition to the ADB could be an 
important strategy for those seeking to ensure the WSHP, if it 
proceeds, does not do so at the expense of Nepali citizens’ rights. 
 D. Filing a Submission with Australia’s National 
Contact Point Pursuant to the Guidelines 
A fourth strategy advocates could use to address rights 
violations arising out of the WSHP could be to utilize the 
procedures set forth in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises (Guidelines) in order to induce SMEC/SMEC-WSHL’s 
 
 154. Id. at 2. 
 155. Id. at i. 
 156. See Erik K. MacDonald, Playing by the Rules: The World Bank’s Failure 
to Adhere to Policy in the Funding of Large-Scale Hydropower Projects, 31 
ENVTL. L. 1011 (2001) (discussing the Arun III development project and the 
World Bank’s review of it); Daniel D. Bradlow, A Test Case for the World Bank, 
11 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 247 (1996) (also discussing the Arun III 
development project and the World Bank’s review of it); Himalayan and 
Peninsular Hydro-Ecological Network, supra note 135 (also discussing the 
same); Escher, supra note 135 (also discussing the same). 
 157. See Bradlow, supra note 156, at 280-82. 
 158. Id. at 281 (describing the World Bank’s withdrawal from the project). 
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compliance with the Guidelines (and respect for the rights of 
Nepali people) in connection with its pursuit of the WSHP. 
The Guidelines are recommendations OECD countries have 
agreed to make to the multinational enterprises operating within 
or from their territories in order to promote sustainable 
development and adherence to standards in such areas as human 
rights, environmental protection, and corruption.159  Each OECD 
country has also committed to have a “National Contact Point” 
available to review claims regarding its multinationals’ conduct 
abroad.160 
With respect to the WSHP, two Guideline principles are 
particularly relevant and could serve as a basis for a submission 
by advocates to Australia’s NCP (ANCP): namely, the principles 
that multinationals should (1) “[c]ontribute to economic, social 
and environmental progress with a view to achieving sustainable 
development;” and (2) “[r]espect the human rights of those 
affected by their activities consistent with the host government’s 
international obligations and commitments.”161  Upon receiving a 
complaint, the ANCP may investigate the complaint, make its 
office available to help facilitate a mediated outcome of a specific 
case, and prepare findings and statements regarding the 
matter.162  While the NCP process has been criticized for not 
 
 159. OECD, Declaration on International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises, in GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 5 (2008), available 
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf. 
 160. OECD, Implementation Procedures of the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, in GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 27, 
30 (2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf  
(requiring parties to establish NCPs for “handling inquiries and discussions 
with the parties concerned on all matters covered by the Guidelines so that they 
can contribute to the solution of problems which may arise in this connection”). 
 161. OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, in GUIDELINES FOR 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 7, 14 (2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf; see also id. at 19-20 (stating that an environmental 
impact assessment should be prepared when “proposed activities may have 
significant environmental, health, or safety impacts,” and that “the lack of full 
scientific certainty [should not be used] as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent or minimize such damage”); The Australian National 
Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, The 
Australian National Contact Point, http://www.ausncp.gov.au/content/contact_ 
point.asp?areaid=18 (last visited Apr. 29, 2009) [hereinafter Australian National 
Contact Point] (describing its roles and responsibilities and providing links to 
further information). 
 162. Australian National Contact Point, supra note 161. 
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living up to its potential to promote adherence to the 
Guidelines,163 NGOs have recently reported being satisfied with 
the ANCP’s willingness to investigate claims.164  This strategy 
could therefore be a useful complement to the other three as it 
would focus attention directly on SMEC/SMEC-WSHL, and would 
not require a huge investment of resources due to the informal 
nature of the system and the work already being done in 
connection with pursuing the other avenues. 
VI. ANALOGOUS ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS 
The issues highlighted above regarding the importance of 
assessing impacts on and by climate change are by no means 
unique to the WSHP.  Indeed, that project is just one part of a 
major undertaking by governments and developers throughout 
the Himalayan region to develop dams for hydropower, water 
storage and other purposes over the coming decades—projects 
which also trigger similar climate change-related 
considerations.165  Illustrating the scope of the issue, a 2008 study 
by International Rivers reported that Nepal, Pakistan, Bhutan 
and India aim to expand the number of hydropower projects in 
their Himalayan regions from the 100 currently existing to a 
future total of 552.166  The roughly 450 projects already under 
construction or planned for future development seek to increase 
current hydropower generating capacity from approximately 
35,000 MW to nearly 190,000 MW.167  These projects, like the 
WSHP, are in areas extremely vulnerable to and already 
experiencing some of the most pronounced effects of climate 
 
 163. See, e.g., John Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and other Business Organizations, A/HRC/8/5, ¶ 98 (Apr. 7, 2008) 
(“The NCPs are potentially an important vehicle for providing remedy.  
However, with a few exceptions, experience suggests that in practice they have 
too often failed to meet this potential.”); OECD Watch, 2008 Review of National 
Contact Points and Their Implementation of the OECD Guidelines:  Submission 
to the Annual Meeting of NCPs, June 2008, http://baseswiki.org/w/images/ 
en/7/7d/OECD_Watch_2008_Review_of_National_Contact_Points_and_the_Impl
ementation_of_the_OECD_Guidelines.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2009), 
[hereinafter OECD Watch 2008 Review]. 
 164. OECD Watch 2008 Review, supra note 163, at 5. 
 165. INT’L RIVERS, supra note 4, at 6-7. 
 166. Id. at 7. 
 167. Id. 
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change;168 and consequently, also like the WSHP, these projects 
require analysis of how climate change affects projections about 
their environmental impacts, physical sustainability, economic 
returns, and ability to advance their development goals.169 
Moreover, the need to take climate change-related 
considerations into account in major development projects 
extends beyond the Himalayan region and the specific context of 
dam development.  Scholars, policymakers, and development 
professionals increasingly recognize the need to systematically 
integrate analysis of climate change adaptation issues within 
development activities so as to ensure those undertakings are 
environmentally and economically sustainable.170  They likewise 
 
 168. See supra notes 4, 36-46. 
 169. See INT’L RIVERS, supra note 4, at 4, 32-36. 
 170. See, e.g., OECD, DECLARATION ON INTEGRATING CLIMATE CHANGE 
ADAPTATION INTO DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION (2006), http://www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/44/29/36426943.pdf (adopted by Development and Environment 
Ministers of OECD Member Countries April 4, 2006 and describing the 
importance of and pledging that the OECD Member Governments “will work to 
better integrate climate change adaptation in development planning and 
assistance”); SIMONE GIGLI & SHARDUL AGRAWALA, STOCKTAKING OF PROGRESS ON 
INTEGRATING ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE INTO DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION 
ACTIVITIES (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/62/39216288. 
pdf (discussing growing awareness of need to integrate adaptation planning 
with development activities and discussing approaches being used to further, 
and challenges arising from, such integration); WORLD BANK, ENVIRONMENTALLY 
AND SOCIALLY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT VICE PRESIDENCY & INFRASTRUCTURE 
VICE PRESIDENCY, CLEAN ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS AN INVESTMENT 
FRAMEWORK (2006), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVCOMM 
INT/Documentation/20890696/DC2006-0002(E)-CleanEnergy.pdf (noting how 
“[i]t is generally accepted that adaptation needs to be mainstreamed into 
national planning and finance agendas.”); WORLD BANK, VICE PRESIDENCY FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, AN INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK FOR CLEAN ENERGY AND 
DEVELOPMENT: A PROGRESS REPORT  (2006), available at http://siteresources. 
worldbank.org/DEVCOMMINT/Documentation/21046509/DC2006-0012(E)-
CleanEnergy.pdf [hereinafter WORLD BANK CLEAN ENERGY INVESTMENT 
FRAMEWORK].   
 
Assessment of climate risks needs to become a regular part of the due 
diligence of development planning. For this to occur . . . appropriate 
information and tools for screening for climate risk must be readily 
available; and new standards for planning and infrastructure must be 
devised. In the longer term [there must be] “better management of 
climate variability and its implications in all relevant sectors, including 
inter alia” infrastructure, agriculture, natural resources and health. 
 
Id. at 37-38 (internal citations omitted); CALIFORNIA DEPT. OF WATER RESOURCES, 
MANAGING AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE: CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION STRATEGIES 
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increasingly recognize how the imperative to combat climate 
change and the consequent expanding landscape of foreseeable 
regulations raising the price on carbon or imposing limits on 
emissions are factors that should be considered given their 
possible impacts on projects’ economic, environmental, and 
political feasibility.171 
When, as in the case of the WSHP, a development project will 
have a foreseeable effect on and/or be affected by climate change, 
government authorities (or other responsible entities) must 
assess those impacts and disseminate their findings to the 
public.172  Failure to do so will not only be unwise from a 
development perspective, but may also violate affected 
individuals’ human rights to information, public participation and 
social justice, and a clean environment—rights which are 
supported and informed by international law,173 as well as 
countries’ domestic legal systems.174  To address or prevent such 
 
(2008), available at http://www.water.ca.gov/climatechange/docs/ClimateChange 
WhitePaper.pdf (providing an example of government efforts to integrate 
consideration of adaptation issues within current planning and investment 
decision-making); Daniel A. Farber, Adaptation Planning and Climate Impact 
Assessments: Learning from NEPA’s Flaws, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,605 (2009) 
(discussing need and mechanisms for ensuring “that we evaluate adaptation 
needs through a sensible, well-designed process”); Mark Latham, Environmental 
Liabilities and the Federal Securities Laws: A Proposal for Improved Disclosure 
of Climate Change-Related Risks, 39 ENVTL. L. 647, 649-707 (2009) (This article 
illustrates various ways in which climate change may impact businesses and 
investments. Many of these impacts could be reduced or eliminated, however, 
with appropriate planning and adaptation efforts). 
 171. See generally, Latham, supra note 170, at 658-63 (discussing some of the 
climate change-related regulatory risks and associated liabilities businesses 
should take into account); WORLD BANK CLEAN ENERGY INVESTMENT 
FRAMEWORK, supra note 170, at 16 (noting that policies and regulations 
mandating the use of specific or cleaner technologies, pricing and taxation 
measures, and caps on emissions all can affect decisions on investment in 
energy infrastructure). See also supra notes 35, 101 (discussing requirements 
that governments consider projects’ possible impacts on climate change). 
 172. See supra Part III. 
 173. See supra Part III. See also Barry E. Hill, Steve Wolfson & Nicholas 
Targ, Human Rights and the Environment: A Synopsis and Some Predictions, 
16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. Rev. 359, 378-81 (2004) (discussing recognition of the 
right to a clean and/or healthy environment under international treaties and by 
international human rights bodies). 
 174. Various authors have referred to the number of national constitutions 
incorporating rights to a clean and/or healthy environment, and generally state 
that there are roughly 100 such constitutions. See, e.g., Kirk W. Junker, Ethical 
Emissions Trading and the Law, 13 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 149, 160 (2006) (“[A] 
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violations, advocates can use many of the same or analogous 
mechanisms discussed above in the context of the WSHP.  In 
particular, many domestic courts throughout the world grant 
broad rights of standing for citizens to seek redress for violations 
of their constitutional rights, which may often include the rights 
to information and to a clean environment.175  Similarly, a host of 
nations and sub-national government entities have established 
human rights institutions (“NHRIs”) like Nepal’s NHRC to 
specifically receive and resolve claims of human rights 
 
survey of constitutions around the world yields more than one hundred 
constitutions that explicitly include the right to a clean natural environment 
among the catalogue of individual rights.”); James R. May, Constituting 
Fundamental Environmental Rights Worldwide, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 113, 
114-15 (2006).  
 
[O]f the 130 constitutions that address the environment, only about sixty 
grant individuals what may fairly be characterized as a fundamental 
right to a ‘clean,’ ‘healthful,’ or ‘favorable’ environment . . .  [And] of these 
sixty, only a handful have earned judicial imprimatur as being 
enforceable by affected individuals. Yet because most [of these 
constitutional provisions protecting fundamental environmental rights] 
are less than a decade old, their transformative repercussions are only 
beginning to be detected. 
 
Id.; Hill, Wolfson & Targ, supra note 173, at 381. “More than ninety national 
constitutions recognize a duty owed by the national government to its citizens to 
prevent harm to the environment. Of these, over fifty recognize the importance 
of a healthy environment, either as a duty of the state or as a right.” Id. The 
authors also note, however, that it is still the “vast minority of countries” in 
which “courts are finding environmental constitutional provisions self-executing, 
conveying both procedural and substantive rights.” Id. at 382. The right to 
information is similarly reflected and protected in national law throughout the 
world. Bernasconi-Osterwalder, supra note 87, at 328  (stating that as of 2006 at 
least 68 countries had enacted laws protecting freedom of information). Indeed, 
according to one calculation, more than “170 different states, provinces and 
nations have enacted EIA legislation” promoting assessment and dissemination 
of information relating to environmental impacts. Nicholas A. Robinson, “NEPA 
and the Rest of the World”: Models for Strengthening EIA from Many Nations, 
SG026 ALI-ABA 285, 287 (2001) (citing N.A. Robinson, EIA Abroad: The 
Comparative and Transnational Experience, in ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS—THE 
NEPA EXPERIENCE  679 (Stephen G. Hildebrand & Johnnie B. Cannon eds., 
1992); see also id. at 290 (stating that “[m]ost developing nations have enacted 
EIA legislation”). 
 175. See Hill, Wolfson & Targ, supra note 173, at 382-89 (discussing legal 
actions to protect human rights to a clean and/or healthy environment (rights 
which are sometimes derivative of other rights such as the right to life) under 
the constitutions of India, the Philippines, Columbia, Chile). 
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violations.176  Further, when international financial institutions 
such as the ADB, African Development Bank, Inter-American 
Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, International Finance Corporation and World Bank 
support the challenged projects, advocates may also seek review 
and relief from those entities’ internal accountability and 
compliance mechanisms.177  The NCP system established to 
ensure and promote implementation of the OECD Guidelines also 
enables petitioners to raise allegations of improper conduct by 
 
 176. The United Nations has been actively encouraging creation of these 
national human rights institutions for decades. See U.N. Centre for Human 
Rights, National Human Rights Institutions: A Handbook on the Establishment 
and Strengthening of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights, Professional Training Series No. 4 at 4--6, U.N. Doc. HR/P/PT/4 
(1995) [hereinafter NHRI Handbook]; see also supra note 137 (referring to the 
“Paris Principles,” guidelines for establishment and operation of NHRIs).  
NHRIs have been defined as bodies “established by a Government under the 
constitution, or by law or decree, the functions of which are specifically defined 
in terms of the promotion and protection of human rights.”  NHRI Handbook, 
supra, ¶ 39; see also Linda C. Reif, Building Democratic Institutions: The Role 
of National Human Rights Institutions in Good Governance and Human Rights 
Protection, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (2000) (discussing the history, structures, 
powers, and effectiveness of NHRIs). More than 100 of these institutions have 
now been created throughout the world. National Human Rights Institutions 
Forum, National Human Rights Institutions, http://www.nhri.net/NationalData. 
asp?ID=107 (last visited May 1, 2010) (containing database of NHRIs around 
the world). In Latin America alone, countries that have established NHRIs 
include Mexico, Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Argentina, 
Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Columbia. Reif, supra note 176, at 51. 
 177. See supra Part III.C (discussing those mechanisms in the ADB and World 
Bank); see also CAROLINE REES & DAVID VERMIJS, MAPPING GRIEVANCE 
MECHANISMS IN THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ARENA 71-91, 103-08 (2008) 
(discussing the compliance mechanisms of the African Development Bank, ADB, 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Inter-American 
Development Bank, and World Bank). Many of these mechanisms do not provide 
for analysis of the institutions’ and/or their contractors’ compliance with human 
rights or environmental standards per se, but instead examine whether the 
institutions complied with their own policies and procedures. Id. While they 
represent progress in ensuring international financial institutions respect 
human rights and environmental standards, these internal mechanisms are 
nevertheless subject to criticism on the ground that they do not sufficiently 
“narrow[ ] the accountability gap” left by application of national and 
international laws to multinational entities. See, e.g., Nathalie L. Bridgeman & 
David B. Hunter, Narrowing the Accountability Gap: Toward a New Foreign 
Investor Accountability Mechanism, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 187 (2008) 
(analyzing and critiquing the accountability mechanisms of institutions such as 
the International Finance Corporation, World Bank, and OECD, and proposing 
an alternative mechanism). 
41
JOHNSON  
552 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  27 
any MNE operating from or within the territory of any OECD 
country.178  Finally, though not discussed above in the context of 
the WSHP, additional strategies that advocates may employ to 
prevent and remedy human rights violations resulting from 
inadequate consideration of climate change-related 
considerations include bringing claims for declaratory or other 
relief from international human rights bodies such as the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol to 
the ICCPR,179 the Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights,180 and the European Court of Human Rights.181 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The challenges posed by climate change require that 
countries examine their development strategies to ensure that 
their planned projects are resilient to the impacts of climate 
change, do not unnecessarily exacerbate the climate change 
challenge, and maximize countries’ competitive advantages in an 
era in which the presence of GHG sinks and low national 
emissions are exploitable assets.  Due diligence is necessary to 
 
 178. See supra notes 160-63. 
 179. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (“A State Party to the Covenant 
that becomes a Party to the present Protocol recognizes the competence of the 
Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals subject to 
its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party of any 
of the rights set forth in the Covenant.”). 
 180. The members of the Organization of American States (OAS) created the 
Inter-American Commission (Commission) in 1959 to help promote human 
rights in the region. See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, What is 
the IACHR?, http://www.cidh.oas.org/what.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2010) (in 
1965, the OAS authorized the Commission to examine petitions and complaints 
alleging violations of human rights by OAS member states). See also American 
Convention on Human Rights arts. 41-51 O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123, entered into force 18 July 1978 (describing the functions, 
competence and powers of the Commission). Among its remedial powers, the 
Commission may recommend member states take measures to protect human 
rights or prevent violations. Id. It can also submit cases to the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights. Id. arts. 48-64. 
 181. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms art. 34, adopted Nov. 5, 1994, Europ. T.S. No. 155 (“The 
Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organization 
or group of individuals claiming to the victim of a violation by one of the High 
Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols 
thereto.”). 
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ensure development activities properly consider impacts by and 
on climate change.  The case of the WSHP illustrates the 
importance of these principles.  Development of that hydropower 
project may be an important strategy for India and Nepal.  Yet it 
should not be pursued as it has—without an adequate 
assessment of its costs and benefits, and at the expense of the 
rights of the Nepali people to information, social justice, and a 
clean environment.  Advocates have and should thus use the 
various tools available to them to seek to cure those rights 
violations and hold the parties responsible, SMEC-WSHL, the 
GoN, and the ADB, to account. 
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